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Abstract 
Using cross-sectional household-level data from seven provincial Cambodian towns, we 
estimate a water demand equation for households connected to the network, and provide 
an empirical measurement of the economic value of tap water connection.  The use of a 
two-step econometric procedure allows us to analyse issues relating to household access to 
water and to the volume of household water consumption. We estimate that the connection 
elasticity with respect to the one-off initial cost of connection is -0.39; the price elasticity of 
water demand for the connected households lies in a range between -0.4 and -0.5; and the 
welfare effects of water connection are approximately 17 percent of the actual expenditure 
of the poor unconnected households. Furthermore, providing a network connection to all 
households in the sample would have the distributional consequences of decreasing the 
estimated Gini coefficient by three percentage points, and the poverty head-count ratio by 
six percentage points.   
 
   3
 
1. Introduction 
As with many developing countries, Cambodia has a low level of water provision: only 24 
percent of the rural population and 60 percent of the urban population have access to water 
services (KOC (2003).  In the last decade, the Cambodian government has been trying to 
improve water provision.  However, the country is still grappling with the consequences of 
decades of war manifested in poor levels of economic and social infrastructures, and depleted 
public utilities. In the difficult process of recovery, the public expenditure on water and 
sanitation in the period 1996-1999 was less than 0.1 percent of GDP per year, and comprised 
less than one percent of the government’s total expenditure financed by revenues (WB (1999) in 
DeRaet and Subbarao (1999); ADB (2000)).  In response to poor development of the network 
outside the capital, the government awarded four private-sector operators the rights to administer 
and operate four water utilities between 1997 and 1998. Thus, both public and private operators 
are currently present in the country as water providers.  
  In a developing country setting characterised by low-coverage and a high level of 
poverty, a key question in designing urban water policy is how the service should be designed to 
meet the needs of both the connected and the (usually poor) non-connected households.  Using 
data originally collected in seven provincial towns (more specifically, seven towns and one 
district) by Garn et al. (2002), we attempt to model the water demand relationship for 
Cambodian households.  Our analysis has three main objectives:  
-  First, to obtain a robust and reliable estimate of the price elasticity of the demand for 
water, as this has important policy content in its own right. Most empirical studies on 
developing countries report price elasticities that vary in a range between -0.6 and –0.2 
(see World Bank (1996); Abdala (1996); Strand and Walker (2004); David and 
Inocencio (1998); Bachran and Vaughan (1994));   4
-  Second, to identify empirically the main constraints for the non-connected households 
in their access to water provided by the network. According to Garn et al. (2002), low 
coverage and high connection fees represent the main barriers to connection for the 
poor in Cambodia. 
-  Third, to evaluate the welfare consequences and the income distributional effects if the 
non-connected households were provided with a connection to network water. Studies 
that attempt to capture the welfare effects of different types of water provision include 
Abdala (1996), Clarke et al., (2002), Moilanen and Schulz (2002), Abou-Ali and 
Carlsson (2004), Torero and Pasco-Font (2001).  In our research, we use as a partial 
template the study of Strand and Walker (2003), which derives welfare estimates of 
access to tap water for 17 cities in Central America and Venezuela. 
  The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides an overview on the current socio-
economic status of Cambodia, emphasizing in particular the current urban water supply 
context.  Section 3 presents the data and the main methodological issues. The use of a two-step 
estimation procedure allows us to analyse separately issues relating both to water access and 
water consumption. Section 4 presents the main econometric results of our research.  The 
estimated price elasticity of water demand provides the basis for welfare analysis using the 
concept of Marshallian consumer’s surplus.  Section 5 contains concluding remarks and offers 
some policy implications of our analysis.  
2. The Current Background 
2.1 Cambodia at a glance  
After three decades of war, genocide, and internal strife that resulted in widespread instability, 
massive loss of life and the devastation of economic and social infrastructures (Wright (1989); 
Chandler (1991)), Cambodia entered a new era in 1993 with national elections. From the 
establishment of the Royal Government of Cambodia (GOC) in 1993 up to 2002, the average   5
annual GDP growth has been 5.5 percent, and the inflation rate has been sharply reduced and 
stabilised. However, despite these macroeconomic improvements, about 36 percent of the 
population is still currently below the basic needs poverty line, and Cambodia is placed at 130
th 
out of 175 countries in the world, as measured by the broader human development indicators 
(UNDP (2001, 2003)).  Furthermore, the situation is worsened by a strong population growth 
rate (2.5 percent per year - KOC (2002)) that strains government finances and affects the quality 
of public services’ supply.    
2.2 Urban water: the current context  
After a long period of international isolation, Cambodia regained its seat at the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in the 1990s, began negotiations to join the WTO
1 and in 1999 
became a member of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (KOC (2001)).  In 
the process of re-establishing itself in the international community, the GOC signed and 
committed to the Millennium Declaration, agreeing to commit itself to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals by the year 2015: the government subsequently adapted its general 
commitments to country-specific targets (Cambodian-MDGs).  In particular, the GOC adopted 
the following targets: 
-  Increase the proportion of rural population with access to safe water source from 24 
percent (in 1998) to 50 percent (in 2015); 
-  Increase the proportion of urban population with access to safe water source from 60 
percent (in 1998) to 80 percent (in 2015) (KOC (2003)). 
  Access to a safe water supply is twice as high in urban areas in Cambodia than in rural 
areas, but remains low compared to many of the neighbouring states, with Thailand, Vietnam 
and Malaysia well above 50 percent) (UNDP (2003); WHO (2000)).  Initial projections suggest 
                                                 
1 On 31 August 2004, the Cambodian parliament ratified the country's WTO entry (Bridges (2004))    6
that Cambodia will be able to meet the target only in rural areas, while in urban areas it will 
reach about 70 percent (NIS, 2000; MOP, 2000 and WHO/UNICEF, 2001 in KOC (2003)). 
  These forecasts may be far too optimistic, however, as only the capital city of Phnom 
Penh exhibits a level of coverage close to 60 percent. In the other provincial towns the average 
coverage level is around 15 percent.  Furthermore, the service is restricted to the central core 
areas (DeRaet and Subbarao (1999)), and future prospects for more adequate coverage in urban 
areas are not helped by high expected population growth rates in urban areas.
2  Furthermore, 
access to safe water decreased in Phnom Penh by about one-fifth between 1997 and 1999, and 
the percentage of the population with access to safe water is low in other urban areas and 
negligible in the rural areas (JBIC (2001). To complete the portrait, many of the existing public 
utilities, re-opened with depleted facilities only in the 1980s, after a long period of shut-down 
between 1975 and 1979, and are generally characterised by frequent breakdowns and poor 
treatment quality (Garn et al. (2002)).  
  Due to this low network coverage, many people either get their water from rivers, 
streams, tanks, wells or purchase it from vendors. These vendors buy the water either from the 
network utilities or acquire it from rivers and tanks and sell it on without any treatment, charging 
prices that are usually about 10 times higher than the official unit-price (DeRaet and Subbarao 
(1999)). Furthermore, water from rivers and lakes, though abundant,
3 is often contaminated due 
to the lack of treatment plants where wastewater from households and industries is discharged 
directly without treatment into the rivers and canals (JICA (1999)).
4 
  Urban health and sanitary conditions have thus become a matter of great concern. The 
Cambodian health system continues to suffer from the legacy of the Khmer Rouge period, where 
                                                 
2 Though, some caution is required here as according to DeRaet and Subbarao (1999), all the towns but Phnom Penh 
do not experience such a population growth rate. 
3 The country has a rich endowment of water, thanks to the Mekong and the Tonle rivers and their tributaries, with 
abundant rainfalls and groundwater largely available but in the hill tract.  
4 However, contrarily to other Asian countries, water pollution does not seem to be a major problem yet (DeRaet 
and Subbarao (1999))   7
there was widespread destruction of primary health infrastructures and a dramatic reduction of 
trained Cambodian doctors (Wright (1989)). Hence, the new government has planned to increase 
public investments to develop better physical and social infrastructures (and human resources) in 
order to meet the increasing pressure on water and sanitation provision in urban areas. 
  However, after decades where public infrastructures have either been closed or 
destroyed, the main constraint for the public sector comes from inadequate financial resources to 
develop an adequate supply and maintenance system. In 1999, government revenues barely 
covered current expenditures. Public expenditure on water and sanitation in the period 1996-
1999 was less than 0.1 percent of GDP per year and less than one percent of the Government’s 
total expenditure as financed through revenues (World Bank (1999) in DeRaet and Subbarao 
(1999); ADB (2000)). The 0.3 percent of GDP per year invested in capital was entirely financed 
by donors. But after initial interest in the water sector in the early 1990s, more recent years have 
attracted less funding (Budds et al. (2003); KOC (2001)), with finance and NGO activity largely 
confined to Phnom Penh.  Moreover, the legal structure governing the provincial utilities is 
confusing and fragmented, characterized by uncertainty about the extent of the authority of the 
Unit of Potable Water Supply (UPWS) (part of the Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy - 
MIME) and the Provincial/Municipal Governors, especially in terms of tariff revision (DeRaet 
and Subbarao (1999)).  Thus, the goal of improving service deliveries is in strong need of 
reform, and requires new and more efficient management of the existing infrastructures and a 
better understanding of the demand-side.  
2.3 Public and private provision of urban water 
  In response to the poor development of the public network (CNPRD (2004)), the 
government awarded four private-sector operators the rights to administer and operate four water 
utilities between 1997 and 1998.  In particular, the private companies took over the whole supply 
in three provincial towns: Bantey Meanchey, Kampong Speau and Takeo. In Kandal, however,   8
the company does not operate the service in the central area of the towns but in a peripheral area 
close to the Mekong River, called Kien Svay. By contrast, in the other 20 towns the service is 
still operated by the public sector.  
  The form of privatisation varies across towns: in Kien Svay the Mekong Water 
Electricity Company signed a build-own-operate (BOO) contract with the Ministry of Industry, 
Mines and Energy, where no public assets were transferred. By contrast, in the other three cases 
the public assets were transferred to the companies in the form of outright concessions for a 
period of between 23 to 40 years. Each company was awarded a three year licence for supplying 
water to residential consumers in the first instance, with the renewal conditional upon water 
quality and tariff stipulations. The discrepancy between the period of the licence and of the 
contract makes the basis of the renewal decision unclear (DeRaet and Subbarao (1999)).  
  The legal basis for the licenses was also very uncertain and the privatisation process was 
not transparent and characterised by ad hoc unsolicited bids made by the government (CNPRD 
(2004)). In all the towns but Kandal there was no competition, and even in Kandal the winner 
was selected through unofficial criteria (Garn et al. (2002)). Moreover, the regulation appeared 
to be deficient, and a clear regulatory framework on the operation of the private companies, such 
as tariff revision and contractual disputes, does not exist. Also the tariff setting formula, on paper 
based on water cost calculation methods, appears to be vague and somewhat ambiguous (DeRaet 
and Subbarao (1999)). Despite this lack of regulation and this general uncertainty, many new 
fixed investments have been made by the private companies to improve the quality, the coverage 
and the overall reliability of their services.   
  Thus, at present, both private and public sectors provide water services in Cambodia. 
Since privatisation represents a very recent phenomenon and in the light of the historical pattern 
of the public utilities, it is worth investigating if the actual service, private or public, effectively 
meets the demand of water, and especially the demand of the low-income part of the population.    9
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Description of the data 
This study exploits a dataset originally used by Garn et al. (2002) to assess and compare the 
performances and consumer satisfaction for four private and four public utilities in Cambodia.
5 
In addition to the four areas served by private companies (three towns and one district), four 
other cities were selected to allow a direct comparison, namely: Kandal (Takmao), Battambang, 
Kampong Chhang and Svay Rieng.
6 The selection process was randomly implemented in order 
to avoid standard problems associated with selection bias. 
  In each town 50 households served by either public or private utilities were randomly 
selected and surveyed through a household questionnaire. Further, in the two towns 
characterised by the presence of sub-contractors, namely Battambang and Kandal, respectively 
25 and 26 additional households were also surveyed.  Overall, a total of 451 connected and 375 
non-connected households provided responses.   
  The questionnaire was administered to an adult member of each household. The 186 
questions yielded information on a total of 200 variables divided into a number of categories  
relating to, inter alia, respondent characteristics, head of household characteristics (e.g., 
educational attainment), water service provider, cost of connection, cost of service, water 
availability and use, water quality, service breakdown/failures, service orientation of water 
utility, satisfaction with water service, household health, general questions about the household 
(e.g., number of members and nature of assets).  
3.2 Theory and Methodology        
Since a key part of the survey contained questions designed to capture the level of satisfaction 
with the existing service, these questions were only answered by the sub-set of connected 
                                                 
5 Garn et al. base their analysis on three questionnaires: Household Questionnaire, Water Utility Questionnaire, 
Technical Assessment Questionnaire. In estimating the water demand equation, our main source of information was 
the Household Questionnaire. However, both the other two have been used for data comparison and to obtain 
additional insights. 
6 Takmao is the provincial town where the survey was carried out for the part of Kandal served by the public sector.    10
households.  However, the first and the last parts of the survey questionnaire were common to all 
respondents. In particular, we have information for all households on the head of the household 
(such as education level, age, ethnic group), and on general household characteristics (such as 
total income, expenditure, and information about assets).  
  Water is considered a commodity consumed by households and thus enters a utility 
function in a standard fashion.  The consumer's utility is considered to be a function of the 
amount of water and on the total amount of other goods consumed. Further, assuming standard 
neoclassical assumptions, if the service is provided applying a constant unit pricing system (as in 
our case), the link with the conventional consumer theory is straight-forward: consumers are 
assumed to maximise utility subject to a budget constraint based on an exogenously determined 
price that is independent of the quantity (previously) consumed, (Dalhuisen et al. (2001)). Thus, 
in an econometric model the volume of water consumption (Wd) ought to be expressed as a 
function of its relative price (P) and other independent variables (Z), including income and a 
variety of household characteristics:  
Wd=f(P,Z) 
  However, while “common” information is observed for all individuals, the continuous 
values for water consumption are only observed for those households who have a metered water 
connection.  This creates a censored data problem and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation 
on the whole sample may lead to potentially biased estimates.  The tobit model (see Tobin 
(1958)), containing both discrete and continuous parts, provides one possible solution to the 
problem of censoring outlined above (tobit results are reported in the empirical section.)  
However, the main constraint of the tobit model is that the effect of the explanatory variables   11
that predict the binary choice of connecting and those that predict the consumption level are 
constrained to have the same sign (Johnston and DiNardo (1997)).
7    
  The Heckman procedure (Heckman (1979)) allows separate estimation of the selection 
and the levels equation, and does not constrain the sign effect of covariates on the probability 
and on the levels.  It also deals with another of selectivity bias problems: since we observe water 
consumption only for households who are connected, these households may not represent a 
random drawing from the population of households.  Thus, fitting an OLS regression model to 
the sample of connected households potentially leads to biased coefficients. The two-step 
Heckman procedure treats the problem as one of omitted variables and it allows us to correct for 
selectivity bias by inserting a proxy variable for the selection effect.  If this correction term -- the 
inverse Mills ratio -- is statistically insignificant, then no selectivity bias is present, and an OLS 
regression using only the connected households provides unbiased and consistent estimates 
(conditional upon the model passing an array of other important diagnostic tests).  This approach 
is sometimes referred to as a generalised tobit.   
  In order to identify the correction term’s parameter, it is crucial to have variables that 
shift the probability of household connection but not the level of household water consumption. 
(These represent the identifying variables that will be discussed in more detail in the empirical 
section.)  However, the coefficient estimates are also highly sensitive to the distributional 
assumption of the underlying probit model (Greene 2003), as the construction of the correction 
term is derived using this explicit assumption. Thus, only after testing for the normality in the 
pseudo-residuals of the reduced form probit selection model will it be possible to test for 
selectivity bias in an adequate or meaningful fashion. 
  All the diagnostic tests reported for the probit and the censored tobit models, except one 
                                                 
7 The presence of heteroskedasticity is likely to represent a problem with much more serious consequences than in 
OLS (linear) regression models leading to biased coefficients. Furthermore, the violation of the normality 
assumption also leads to inconsistency in both estimates.   12
relating to the test for the tobit specification,
8 are based on the efficient score tests originally 
suggested by Chesher and Irish (1987).  These tests use the score contributions
9 of the 
coefficients of the model to implement Lagrange Multiplier tests based on the matrix expression:  
      i’R(R’R)
-1R’i   
where i is an n x 1 vector of ones and R is an n x q matrix of the score contributions for each of 
the k parameters from the original specification and the k + 1, …q parameters assumed to be 0 
under the null hypothesis, with the test statistics distributed as a chi-squared with p = q – k 
degrees of freedom. In this way, functional form can be tested by inserting (predicted) higher 
order terms of the standardised probit index; homoskedasticity by using the set of original 
variables of the model to provide a heteroskedastic alternative; and normality by allowing for 
skewness and kurtosis in the pseudo-residuals.
10   
  Since in the absence of normality any inference about selectivity bias may be incorrect, a 
recent literature suggests use of a combination of non-parametric and parametric techniques to 
make the procedure less sensitive to violations in this assumption. One technique is based on 
approximating the selection correction term through a polynomial formed by a power series of 
the original Mills ratio term. The polynomial thus obtained is then added to the model as 
additional regressors in the second stage of the procedure.
11   
  The econometric analysis will allow us to estimate both an access-to-water probability 
equation and a water demand equation.  The former model allows us to identify the main barriers 
                                                 
8 This test is computed as a Likelihood Ratio Test: -2[L
tobit-(L
truncated+L
probit)], where the maximized log-likelihood 
value of the tobit and the sum of the two maximised log-likelihood values of the truncated tobit and the probit 
models are compared (see Lin and Schmidt (1984)). The chi-squared has (k
truncated+k
probit-k
tobit) degrees of freedom, 
where k indicates the number of parameters estimated.  
9 The score contributions for the coefficients are given by multiplying the pseudo-residuals of the model by the 
explanatory variables. The former are obtained as the first order derivatives of the log-likelihood function with 
respect to the probit model’s constant term.  
10 Using Monte Carlo simulations, Orme (1990) demonstrated the poor finite sample properties of the type of outer-
product- gradient (OPG) tests used here, arguing that efficient score tests constructed with the OPG variance-
covariance matrix  tend to reject the null hypothesis too frequently. It should be noted that passing a given score test 
thus provides a more stringent task for us given the findings of Orme (1990) in this case.    
11 See Newey (1999) for a theoretical exposition and Buchinsky (1998) for an application, albeit within a quantile 
regression model framework   13
and potential constraints to connection.  Determining the value of obtaining water connection, in 
particular, would allow us to simulate possible income redistribution scenarios, since non-
connected households have generally a lower income than the connected ones and face higher 
prices for a unit of water.   
   We estimate the welfare gain for a household that changes from the price applied by the 
vendors (P(0))
12 (and a certain amount of water consumption W(0)) to the official price applied by 
the water utility (P(i)) (and a certain amount of water consumption W(i)).  Since estimates of the 
economic values of such amenities are highly uncertain and due to difficulties in using other 
methods, we use as a template the study conducted by Strand and Walker (2003, 2004) that 
derived estimates of access to tap water in 17 cities in Central America and Venezuela.
13 The 
log-linear form of the water demand equation can be expressed (ignoring conventional error 
terms) as:
14 
                                               ) ( ln ) ( ) ( ln i P i A i W η − =                                 [3.1] 
where A(i) identifies all factors other than price that influence household’s i water consumption 
and η is the estimated price elasticity. Starting from equation [3.1] and exploiting the definition 
of consumer’s surplus, and thus calculating the area under the Marshallian demand curve 
between the old and new price (monetary measure of the individual’s utility change), it is 
possible to obtain the following expression: 




























i W i P i CS    [3.2] 
which allows us to calculate the change in CS(i) without having to proxy W(0) (see Strand and 
Walker (2003)). 
                                                 
12 Information reported by DeRaet and Subbarao (1999). 
13 The very detailed data set available allow them to calculate the welfare gain also using the hedonic price method. 
14 The use of formula [3.1] is obviously inappopriate for the censored tobit specification and more relevant to the 
generalised tobit model we use below.     14
  Following this theoretical framework, and conditional upon obtaining unbiased estimates 
of the price elasticity of water demand, we are thus able to determine welfare effects. This 
procedure, however, requires the exercise of some caution for a number of reasons. First, the CS 
obtained is calculated implicitly assuming that the only alternative to piped-water is water from 
vendors (ignoring other possible sources, that might well be cheaper or more expensive, such as 
own wells, public standpoints, rivers and lakes, tracks, etc.) and not accounting for any kind of 
externality. Second, performing the analysis on the sample pooled across the public and private 
providers may neglect differences in consumer responses across these two types of provision. 
Third, since the values used in deriving the income reduction of losing the connection comes 
from the connected-households, the measure obtained is more interpretable as a Willingness To 
Accept (WTA) rather than a Willingness To Pay (WTP) concept.  It should be noted that the two 
measures usually give different results (see Horowitz and McConnell (2002)) with WTA greater 
than WTP.   
3.3 Choice of the Variables and Data Reliability 
A preliminary analysis was undertaken to identify potential outliers and unreasonable 
observations (e.g., households with a water bill higher than the expenditure/income declared). 
After cleaning the data and dealing with the problem of missing information, the sample size 
was reduced from 826 to 782 usable observations, specifically yielding 354 non-connected and 
428 connected households corresponding to the set of censored and uncensored observations 
respectively.  We now turn to a discussion of the independent variables used in our analysis.  
Price 
The price variable identifies the unit tariff paid per cubic meter of water consumed. At the time 
of the survey, all the utilities analysed were applying a two-part uniform tariff for all the 
consumers connected.
15 Since the price declared by the household often differed from the 
                                                 
15 The consumer pays a fixed charge to get connected and a charge related to water consumption. The price per unit 
consumed is constant, and the water bill is given by quantity used times the unit tariff.   15
official one,
16 we constructed the price variable in a number of ways. We report here results 
obtained using the following two price variables:  
-     price1 was generated using the official price reported by the utilities for the 
corresponding town. Even though the price reported by the companies is likely to be less 
prone to measurement error, this variable neglects the presence of subcontractors;  
-     price2 was generated using the official prices reported by the utilities for the 
corresponding town but substituting the subcontractors prices for the households supplied 
by subcontractors. However, it must be borne in mind that in the case of the censored 
tobit using only the official prices for the missing values, we assume that all the non-
connected households face only the price set by the utilities, ignoring the possibility of 
being supplied by a subcontractor. Unfortunately, the lack of more precise information 
(e.g., the location of the household and the areas served by sub-contractors) does not 
allow us to assign more precise values to this variable.  
Fee 
In the computation of this variable, we included not only the actual connection fee, but the entire 
amount households have to pay to get connected (which sometimes includes extra charges), in 
order to have a better proxy for overall connection costs. While all private utilities apply a fixed 
fee that covers labour charges, cost of piping materials, the water meter and other connection 
expenses, public utilities have different methods to set the fee.  This varies with the distance 
from the network and with the condition of the road (as in Kampong Chhang, Kandal and Svay 
Rieng)
17 to cases where the connection does not cover the cost of materials (as in Svay Rieng). 
Due to the lack of information and to the large variation in the self-reported amounts, we 
decided once again to use a town-specific value that includes all the expenses reported by the 
                                                 
16 The respondent ma have reported a different price than the one actually paid (depending on, say, level of 
education or other characteristics), or there may have been episodes of recall error. 
17 In Kandal and Svay Rieng, costumers had to pay for the permission and for any damages caused by the lying of 
the pipe on the bitumen road. Apparently, this is not a peculiarity of Cambodia (see Brocklehurst et al. (2002)).    16
household (connection fee plus labour charges plus other charges). We eliminated a number of 
obvious outliers and substituted the location-specific mean value instead.
18  
Expenditure versus Income 
The development literature supports the notion that, when dealing with household surveys in 
developing countries, estimated household expenditure is a better proxy of household welfare 
than income.  The fact that households are likely to purchase and consume a narrow range of 
goods and services (Hentschel and Lanjouw (1996)) makes total expenditure less volatile than 
income. Furthermore, households surveyed are more likely to understate their incomes than 
overstate their expenditures (Deaton (1997)).  Besides these conceptual considerations, in our 
case the choice of the expenditure measure also relates to practical considerations, since the 
income variable contained more missing observations than the expenditure one (194 versus 95 
out of the 782 households). After careful analysis, we substituted the missing information with 
the expenditure mean values for each town.    
  In order to explore the robustness of the measures used, we calculated the monthly mean 
expenditure per capita, the Gini coefficient, and the poverty head-count ratio (using the 
household expenditure variable constructed by substituting missing values with the town mean 
expenditure values.) In all cases, the values obtained were fairly close to the ones reported in 
official statistics.
19 However, additional analysis suggested that households with assets are less 
likely to declare their expenditure, but are more likely to be in the top end of the expenditure 
                                                 
18 It is also worth pointing out that for the public utilities but for the Komponch Chhang Water Utility we do not 
know when the fee was set. This requires caution in interpreting the results, given the very high inflation rate that 
characterized the country in the early 1990s (NIS (2004)). Contrarily, all the private water utilities started operating 
quite recently (1997-1998), just after inflation had been drastically reduced and stabilized (the inflation rate at the 
year of the questionnaire was around 3.3 percent). 
19 Sample monthly mean expenditure per capita: 292.1 US$ (KOC (2003), reports a GDP per capita in 2002 US$ of 
297 and UNDP (2002), of 280); sample Gini coefficient: 40.9 (UNDP (2003), reports a GINI coefficient of 40.4, 
calculated in 1997); sample head-count ratio: 35.2 percent (UNDP (2003) and KOC (2003) reports an head-count of 
around 36 percent, according to 1997 and 1999 estimates).    17
distribution.
20  This suggests that some caution about the applied methodology is required, as the 
missing information might be interpreted as belonging to a part of the population with expenditure 
levels somewhat above the mean.  
  The treatment of expenditure as an exogenous measure may also be interpreted as 
problematic.
21  In order to inform on this issue we conducted a number of Hausman tests for each 
relevant empirical application.  In those cases where a significant test was encountered, predictions 
were used instead of actual values.    
Other Variables 
In all model specifications, we control for ‘city effects’ by introducing six city dummies (using 
the two cities Bantey Manchey and Kandal as the omitted dummy variable).  Due to the two-part 
uniform tariff system and the possibly high level of collinearity, one of our major 
methodological concerns was the use of the city-dummies together with the price and the fee 
variables. However, in all the estimated models these dummies generally possess strong 
explanatory power. A possible explanation for this is that they capture other town-specific 
characteristics such as population characteristics, life quality, industrialization level, network 
characteristics, environment, and climate, etc.  We presume that the low level of coverage of the 
service, one of the main constraints to obtaining a connection according to Garn et al. (2002), is 
captured by the city specific fixed -effect control.  
  Table 3.1 lists and describes the other variables used in our analysis.   
[Insert Table 3.1 here] 
  In some model specifications we allow a number of asset-variables to be present together 
with household expenditure. Despite the risk of high correlation, we believe that assets may 
more accurately capture household wealth, beyond the narrow household expenditure definition 
                                                 
20 The analysis was conducted dividing the observations for those who declared their expenditure by quintile, 
creating a dummy for each quintile plus an additional “control” dummy containing all the missing values, and 
running a tobit and a OLS regression with these variables as additional regressors.  
21 The uniform-price system does not present the econometric issue typical of the increasing block rate systems, 
where the price of water both determines, and is determined by, consumption (Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989)).    18
(Filmer and Pritchett 2001). The use of wealth measures may be helpful if individuals tend to 
understate their level of income and expenditure. Thus, all the regressions for all the models 
were run with and without assets.  
3.4 Discussion of Summary Statistics  
Selected summary statistics of the sub-sample used for this analysis are as follows:   
-  each household comprises, on average, about 6.3 members (the standard deviation is 
2.6)
22, with no substantial difference between connected and non-connected households.  
This is slightly higher than the average household size reported by official statistics: 5.7 
in urban areas (CNPRD (2004));  
-  the average age of the respondent is 45 years (10.8);  
-  on average, there are 1.76 (0.86) people earning money among the non-connected 
households, versus 2.40 (1.45) among the connected ones ; 
-  more than 30 percent of the non-connected, and about 18.5 percent of the connected 
heads of household, have not primary completed school .  
The mean household total income is Riels 548,823 (980,489) and the mean total expenditure is 
Riels 547,511 (985,901), around US$140.
23  However, the difference between connected and 
non-connected households is quite striking.  The average income per capita for the connected 
households is 123,398 (206,542); for non-connected households it is 64,178 (54,011), which 
indicates that a large share of the non-connected households are poor.
24  The household 
expenditure for connected households is 124,676 (210,022); for non-connected households it is 
                                                 
22 Standard deviations reported in parentheses in the rest of this sub-section. 
23 At the time of the survey and all along 2002, year of the UNDP statistics considered, the exchange rate was about 
3900 Riels=1US$.  
24 According to the Ministry of Planning (2002), the 1999 National Poverty Line was around 54,050 Riels per head 
per month.    19
58,987 (s.d. 43,496).
25  A comparable difference in household assets between the two sub-
samples is detailed in Table 3.2.  
[Insert Table 3.2 here] 
For the 428 connected households, the average monthly water consumption is about 13.9 cubic 
meters (10.8) (see Table A1), which translates to about 2.2 monthly cubic meters per capita, or 
72 litres per day.
26  
4. Econometric results 
4.1 Censored Tobit Estimation and Model Diagnostics 
Table 4.1 reports the results for the tobit model using the price1. (We verified that the use of 
price1 or price2 does not materially affect the main results).  Columns (1), (2) and (3) indicate 
three different specifications: 
(1) with assets, treating (according to the exogenity test) expenditure as exogenous; 
      (2) without assets, without correcting for the endogeneity of expenditure;  
      (3) without, assets correcting for the endogeneity of expenditure.  
[Insert Table 4.1 here]   
  In general, the estimated coefficients of the price, expenditure and household-size 
variables have the expected sign and reasonable magnitudes, and are well determined.  Only in 
specification (3) does the magnitude of the expenditure coefficient seem to be implausibly large, 
and the estimated coefficient for household size is insignificant.  As expected, the coefficient of 
expenditure in (1) is somewhat lower than in the other specifications. The coefficients for the 
wealth proxies exhibit the expected sign and, in most of the cases, are statistically significant at a 
conventional level.   
                                                 
25 This pattern is observed also in other parts of Asia (e.g., India - Foster et al. (2003a)) and in other developing 
countries (e.g., Guinea - Clarke et al. (2002)) 
26 Compared to a European average of about 4.5 cubic meters per capita per month (roughly 150 litres per capita per 
day - EEA (2003)).      20
  Table 4.2 reports price and expenditure elasticities computed by dividing the marginal 
effects
27 (see A2) by the  unconditional expected value of the continuous variable watcon, 
reported as 7.64 at the mean sample values.  
[Insert Table 4.2 here] 
     Ceteris paribus, a 10 percent price increase decreases monthly water consumption by about 
3.4 percent, 4.7 percent and 5.6 percent for specifications (1), (2), and (3) respectively.
28, 
29  For 
household expenditure, the results are less clear-cut.  For specifications (1) and (2) the elasticity 
is estimated at 0.56 and 0.80 respectively (0.55 and 0.80 using the log of  price2).  However, the 
elasticity estimate for specification (3), 1.64, suggests an effect that is well in excess of unity.   
  However, as shown in the last section of Table 4.1, the tobit model fails all the 
diagnostics, which casts doubt on both the consistency of the ML coefficients and their sampling 
variances.
30 The key distributional assumption of the tobit model is violated, and (except for 
specification (3) the model fails the RESET.  In addition, the model fails the tobit specification 
test based on a Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) and there is evidence of heteroscedasticity.  In the 
light of the major problems associated with the censored tobit, we obtain estimates using the 
more flexible generalized tobit model or the Heckman two-step procedure. 
4.2 The Probit and the Corrected OLS Regressions 
As described in the previous section, the probit model includes – in addition to the variables 
featured in the tobit model -- a set of identifying instruments. As detailed in Table 4.3, the 
McFadden Pseudo-
2 R  indicates a very good fit for a cross-sectional model,
31 and the goodness 
                                                 
27 Marginal effects are evaluated at the means of the independent variables  
28 Using the marginal effects evaluated at the observed censoring rate of the dependent variable the elasticities are 
only slightly higher (by one percentage point) 
29 Using price2 (in its logged form) the estimates are statistically insignificant for the corresponding specification 
(1), but suggest relatively inelastic effects for the other two specifications. See Table A2 for details. 
30 We have already stressed how the presence of heteroskedasticity, in particular, contains more severe 
consequences for the tobit model than does its presence in a linear regression model.  
31 The Pseudo R
2 is defined as [1-(L 
restricted/L 
unrestricted], where L identifies the maximised value of the Likelihood 
function.     21
of fit of the model is also confirmed by the measure suggested by Cramer (1999).
32 The 
percentage of correct predictions is fairly high (80 percent) but Train’s (2003, p.73) reservations 
on this measure are well founded.  The null of exogeneity of expenditure is upheld by the data.  
The set of identifying instruments is comprised of five (four depending on the specification) 
variables.
33 The validity of these instruments is tentatively confirmed by the fact that their 
omission from the levels regression is upheld by the data (see Wald tests, Table 4.4). The 
variables that perform the task of identifying the selection effect in this case are thus logfee, 
ethnic, age, agesq, years and D_mul.  It is conceded that these are somewhat ad hoc but appear 
to perform the necessary task. 
[Insert Table 4.3 here] 
  Based on the results presented in Table 4.3, the estimated coefficient for logfee, a 
relevant identifying variable, is well determined, and suggests that, ceteris paribus, a 10 percent 
increase in the one-off connection charge reduces the probability of getting connected by about 
two percentage points.
34 The estimated coefficient for (log) expenditure, also highly significant, 
suggests that, ceteris paribus, a 10 percent increase in the expenditure level increases the 
probability of connection by about four percentage points.
35    
  The average connection elasticity with respect to the connection fee, computed by 
dividing the original marginal effects by the sample average connection rate (0.547), is -0.39, 
while that calculated with respect to expenditure is 0.68 (which appears on the high side). The 
probit model without assets (not reported), though somewhat inferior in terms of diagnostics, 





























⎛ Φ = 0 _ | 1 _ |
^ ^
watcon D X watcon D X i i β β λ =0.424. This measure is merely 
descriptive, and it is not considered a proper statistic with a known distribution (Cramer (1999)). 
33 Correcting for the endogeneity of expenditure, one variable (ethnic) no longer performs the task of identification.  
34 Again, given the logarithmic nature of the regressor, we can obtain the effect of a ten percentage change on the 
connection decision by multiplying the marginal effect by 0.1 (see A3). 
35 It is likely that this last estimate understates this effect, due to collinearity between the expenditure measure and 
household assets. However, the model with assets outperforms the model without assets and the difference in the 
implied marginal effect is not too large. For example, without assets a 10 percent increase in the expenditure level 
would increase the probability of getting connected by about 4.44 percentage points.   22
gives very similar results, with a connection elasticity with respect to the fee of -0.36 and an 
expenditure elasticity of about 0.81.
36 
  All the estimated coefficients for the assets are plausible except for the car estimate. It is 
worth noting the large coefficient for the variable telephone: a household with such an appliance, 
ceteris paribus, is about 33 percentage points more likely to be connected than a household 
without a telephone. The coefficient on ethnic is also notable: non-Khmer people, mostly 
Chinese, are about 31 percentage points more likely to get connected than Khmer people.  The 
estimated coefficients for the education dummies are poorly determined. The estimated 
coefficient for members is also statistically insignificant (this is in line with the findings of Alaba 
and Alaba (2002)). The negative sign may tentatively suggest that the greater the number of 
members, the more possibilities the household has to get water in a number of different ways 
and from a number of different sources.  
  The model fails the key econometric assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity but 
the RESET value is marginal and could be viewed as less of a concern. As a consequence, the 
estimated variance-covariance matrix is adjusted using Huber’s (1967) correction.  Greene 
(2000, pp.823-4) notes, however, that such a correction to the variance-covariance matrix for an 
otherwise inconsistent estimator may be insufficient to redeem it.  Nevertheless, the adjusted 
asymptotic t-values do not deviate much from the original ones and do not alter materially the 
statistical significance of the estimated coefficients. 
  This model provides us with some degree of confidence about the factors that influence 
connection, and those that represent the main obstacles to connection. However, the marginal 
nature of the normality test suggests some caution about the construction of the selectivity 
correction term.  For this reason, higher orders (to the third power) of the inverse Mills are added 
as additional regressors in the second stage of the procedure, to proxy for selection effects. 
                                                 
36 Though, in this second case the model would have to be corrected for the endogeneity of expenditure, altering the 
elasticity point estimates to -0.45 and 1.45 respectively.     23
Surprisingly, the null hypothesis that the connected sample of households is random is upheld by 
the data at a conventional level in the water demand equation. Furthermore, a joint Wald test on 
the three additional components of the Mills reveals that they exert no role in the regression 
model (see Table 4.4).
37  In the light of these results, the selection terms are omitted in the final 
specifications reported in Table 4.4, and the reported estimates are based on the standard OLS 
procedure.  (For brevity, we present the results of the OLS regression without assets. It should be 
noted, however, that the inclusion the assets in the various specifications does not alter the 
estimated magnitude of the price elasticity of demand, a primary focus of our policy interest.) 
  Table 4.4 presents the results for four specifications: 
38 
(1) OLS with price1 (logged), treating expenditure as exogenous; 
(2) OLS with price1 (logged), correcting for the endogeneity of expenditure;  
(3) OLS with price2 (logged), treating expenditure as exogenous; 
(4) OLS with price2 (logged), correcting for the endogeneity of expenditure. 
[Insert Table 4.4 here] 
  The overall explanatory power in all the cases is more than adequate and is somewhat 
higher than OLS-based models that have used cross-sectional micro-data in this type of 
application (see Strand and Walker (2004), Bachran and Vaughan (1994), Jones and Morris 
(1984)).  Since all the models exhibit heteroskedasticity, the variance-covariance matrix was 
corrected with the Huber robust estimator (Huber (1967)). However, as in the case of the probit 
model, the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients is affected only marginally by the 
modification. All the specifications perform well in terms of normality, which allows us to have 
some confidence in the testing principle adopted.  In contrast, the RESET provides some 
                                                 
37 Since the presence of heteroskedasticity violates the use of a conventional F-test (which assumes a constant 
variance), a Wald test (that uses the corrected variance covariance matrix) was performed instead.  
38  As noted earlier, there is an issue about whether the inclusion of the city effects in conjunction with the logged 
price variables allows for a clean identification of the price effect.  This is a more accute issue in regard to price1 
than price2.  All the models for which estimates are reported in table 4.4 were re-estimated without the city controls. 
The estimated price effects are only marginally attenuated by the exclusion of these controls.  Our preference is to 
include the city controls to capture omitted city-specific factors that may be important in the determination of water 
demand.          24
conflicting results.  Although the RESET is passed for those models that use actual household 
expenditure (though only at 95 percent and 90 percent confidence level), the test is not passed 
for the models that use the predicted values.  Some degree of caution is thus warranted when 
drawing conclusions as our estimates may be subject to some bias.  
  In spite of the foregoing concerns, many of the results appear to be highly robust across 
all the specifications.  In particular, as shown in Table 4.5, the price elasticity, always 
significant, displays the most robust behaviour ranging in the interval -0.5 to –0.4. These 
plausible estimates are in line with the estimated price elasticity of demand obtained using tobit 
(as reported in the previous section) and OLS models (not reported) with the set of assets.  By 
contrast, the expenditure elasticity, also highly significant, ranges from around 0.2 in 
specifications that use actual expenditures, to around 0.7 in specifications that used the predicted 
values.  In specifications (2) and (4), the estimated coefficients for other variables appear to be 
affected by the endogenous treatment of expenditure. However, caution is again required in 
interpreting these estimates, since the specifications do not pass the Ramsey RESET. 
[Insert Table 4.5 here]   
  Other results of this model richly portray the nature of water demand among connected 
households in Cambodia. The estimated coefficient for the variable quality, significant at the 10 
percent level for two of the specifications, confirms the positive relationship between perceived 
water quality and consumption. The coefficient for the variable trade is always highly 
significant, and suggests, ceteris paribus, that households engaged in trade consume around 85 
percent more than those who do not engage in trade of one kind or another.
39 This result appears 
robust across all the reported specifications.  Using water for gardening or for animals does not 
influence the level of household water consumption. In addition, sharing the connection does not 
affect consumption.  Thus, one of the arguments presented by Whittington and Boland (2002b) 
                                                 
39 The effect is calculated using the formula: [e
0.6203-1]x100=85.9, where e represents the anti-logarithm of the 
natural logarithm. This procedure is used when the dependent variable is expressed in natural logarithm and the 
explanatory variable is a dummy measure.    25
against the IBTs system, by which the households that share a connection consume and pay 
more, does not appear to have relevance in this application.
40  The presence within a household 
of one additional member, ceteris paribus, increases monthly water consumption by between 
two percent (specifications (2) and (4)) and six percent (specifications (1) and (3)), which is in 
line with the estimated marginal effects reported in the tobit.
41  The household-size elasticity 
ranges from 0.14 (specifications (2) and (4)) to 0.36 (specifications (1) and (3)). The range in 
these estimates is comparable to ones found in other studies (see Razafindralambo et al. (2002); 
Strand and Walker (2004); Rietveld et al. (1997)).  The estimated coefficient for the variable 
education is statistically insignificant in most of the specifications, despite the fact that, on 
average, non-connected households have lower levels of education than connected households 
(see summary statistics). This may suggest that education effects in regard to water consumption 
are mediated through the expenditure measure. 
4.3 The Welfare Analysis 
In the light of the significant and highly robust results obtained for the price elasticity, we are in 
a position to calculate, with a certain degree of confidence, the welfare effects of water access 
and use, exploiting the concept of a change in Marshallian consumers’ surplus. Following the 
approach of Strand and Walker (2003), we present the main results in Table 4.6, reporting the 
estimates for our lower bound elasticity estimate (η=0.4). (In table A4 results based on η=0.5 are 
also reported, together with those obtained using the income rather than the expenditure 
variable.)   
  The first two columns give average household real-expenditure figures, by town, for 
connected and non-connected households (in Riels). Since the connected households already 
benefit from the welfare gain, their real-expenditure (RE) includes the computed net consumer 
                                                 
40 Further, according to the summary statistics in the Cambodian case this type of households does not necessarily 
belong to the low-income group, which makes the Whittington critique not applicable   
41 According to the censored tobit, the percentage would range from around 2.6 percent (if computed on the average 
consumption for those who consume) to around 4.5 percent (if computed on the unconditional expected value of 
water consumption at the mean sample values).   26
surplus. The third column indicates the change in CS, and the fourth column gives the 
expenditure figures when all currently non-connected households are provided with the water 
connection. 
[Insert Table 4.6 here] 
  The last two columns of Table 4.6 report the ratios, by town, of real-expenditure of non-
connected households to real-expenditure of connected households.  On average and across the 
eight towns, the change from 0.45 to 0.53 in the ratio clearly indicates the potential gains of 
providing the service to all.  
  Our results are not directly comparable to those reported in Strand and Walker (2003) 
due to differences in the context and to the different price elasticity of demand used.  However, 
in relative terms, the change in percentages can provide some insights.  The change in the ratio 
for Strand and Walker (2003) is, on average across the cities and using their elasticity estimate 
of 0.3, about 13 percentage points, in our case the same ratio using an absolute elasticity of 0.4 
induces a change of about eight percentage points (seven using η=0.5). Considering that the ratio 
P(0)/P(i) in our case is, on average, around 7.5, while in Strand and Walker it assumes far higher 
values (over 20), and given the higher elasticity, our results can be considered plausible.  On 
average and across the towns, a non-connected household would experience a change in welfare 
of about 56,000 Riels -- representing roughly 17 percent of its actual monthly household 
expenditure (the percentage would be 15 percent using a price elasticity estimate of 0.5). 
  Table 4.7 reports the change in the Gini that would be obtained if one tentatively added 
the welfare gains of the connection to the expenditure/income of the non-connected 
households.
42  
[Insert Table 4.7 here] 
                                                 
42 Again, the use of price1 or price2 does not affect the main results   27
  It is clear that the estimated Gini coefficient would decrease by between 2.5 to 3.5 
percentage points.  This is not an inconsequential effect, considering that currently the 
Cambodian Gini coefficient is among the highest within the set of Asian countries (KOC (2001, 
2003)).  
  Our welfare analysis also reveals that, using an elasticity estimate of 0.4, providing 
connection to all would decrease the poverty head-count ratio by about 6.8 percentage points; 
using the higher absolute elasticity of 0.5, this would decrease by about 5.4 percentage points. 
Using the income variable, the corresponding changes would be 4.5 and 3.8 percentage points 
respectively.
43  The interpretation of these large changes merits some caution since this poverty 
measure is clearly biased in favour of individuals placed close to the poverty line. Furthermore, 
the poverty line itself, upon which the head-count is calculated, does not take into account 
differences between rural and urban areas.     
  It could be argued that use of the city fixed-effects in the process of obtaining the price 
elasticity of demand does not capture adequately the differences between the private and the 
public sector in the effect of the variables on households’ water consumption.  Unfortunately, the 
limited variation in the price data across the two service provider types does not allow us to 
conduct a deeper analysis of this issue. However, as a suggestive exercise, in the water 
consumption OLS regressions we substituted a dummy assuming a value 1 if public-supplier and 
a value of 0 if a private-supplier.  Our analysis suggests that households supplied by private 
utilities may be more price-sensitive. Thus, for the four areas supplied by the private sector, in 
light of the higher price elasticity, the welfare analysis may need to be adjusted downwards. 
Further investigation of this potentially important issue is clearly required; given data 
limitations, we are not able to pursue it to rigorously here. 
 
                                                 
43 The calculations are based on the 1999 National Poverty Line reported in the summary statistics (Ministry of 
Planning (2002))   28
5. Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications 
The micro-level analysis reported for seven provincial Cambodian towns addressed three main 
questions. First, what are the main barriers for the poor to get connected to the water distribution 
network? Second, how does consumption of the existing consumers change with price?  Third, 
what are the welfare consequences of pursuing a policy that provides water to all households?  
  A censored tobit and a Heckman two-step procedure were used to address these 
questions. In line with Garn et al. (2002), key results from the first stage estimation confirm that 
the main barrier for the poor seems to be the one-off initial cost, where the connection fee 
elasticity was estimated at about -0.39.  The second stage analysis provided significant and 
robust price elasticity estimates ranging between -0.4 and -0.5.  These estimates are in line with 
other empirical studies that using data from developing countries. The expenditure elasticity 
estimates, however, were more variable across the estimated models and provided estimates in 
the range between 0.2 and 0.7.  
  Using the price elasticity estimate and exploiting the concept of Marshallian consumers’ 
surplus, the possible welfare gains achievable through providing water connection to set of 
currently non-connected households were highlighted. On average and across the towns, using 
the estimated price elasticity of -0.4, the ratio of household expenditure of the non-connected 
households to the household expenditure of connected households would increase from 0.45 to 
0.53.   This perhaps understates the true welfare benefits, as such connections would also 
generate ‘spillover’ effects through unmeasured positive externalities on health.  (It is stressed, 
however, that our study did not provide a framework for exploring this latter issue.)  In addition, 
there would also be effects on household expenditure (income) distribution.  Our analysis 
suggests that the welfare changes would induce the Gini coefficient to decrease by about three 
percentage points. The poverty head-count ratio is also estimated to decrease by about six 
percentage points. As noted, the results from the welfare analysis have to be treated with some   29
degree of caution for a number of reasons, ranging from assumptions used in the specification 
and estimation of our demand equation (e.g., the construction of the price and the fee variable, 
our treatment of missing values on expenditure) to the ones invoked for the welfare analysis 
(e.g., the vendors’ price is assumed to be the only alternative, and the fact that the measure 
captures a WTA rather than a WTP concept).  However, the general robustness of the earlier 
results in regard to the price elasticity of demand allows us to draw some tentative policy 
conclusions.  
The case of connection subsidies 
As stressed earlier, one of the main obstacles for the non-connected households is the one-off 
initial cost of the connection fee. The large benefits that would occur connecting the poor would 
amount, on average, to roughly 17 percent of their actual expenditure (16 percent for income), 
which represents a sizeable gain , bearing in mind that international benchmarks suggest that 
water bills amounting to between 3 percent and 5 percent of income are most affordable for the 
poorest households (Foster et al. (2000)). In the light of this result, it is reasonable to infer that  -
- once they are connected -- the poor may be able to pay a non-subsidised tariff equal to the 
general tariff.
44  
  This suggests a clear policy option: a connection (rather than a consumption) subsidy 
scheme.  This may represent an important step in the process of providing water to all 
households, including the poorest households.  In the Cambodian case, as in other developing 
countries, the fact that the non-connected households exhibit an expenditure which, on average, 
is half that of the connected would make targeting connection subsidies relatively easy to 
implement.
45  Furthermore, targeted connection subsidies appear to exhibit leakage rates and 
                                                 
44 Once connected, as many case studies show, the willingness to pay for water and sanitation services of the poor is 
often higher than the actual operating and maintenance (O&M) costs and higher than actual tariff per unit (Foster et 
al. (2000) for Panama; Walker et al. (2000) for South American cities; Ahmad et al. (2003) for Bangladesh; 
Brocklehurst and Evans (2001)).  
45 Other alternatives based on geographic targeting are ruled out by the Cambodian context: in the provincial towns 
the poor communities do not live together, being they scattered all over the town (DeRaet and Subbarao (1999))   30
errors of inclusion that are less than one quarter of the ones associated with the application of 
consumption subsidies (Foster et al. (2003b)). Most of all, errors of exclusion, a great concern 
from a poverty reduction perspective (as they identify the people genuinely poor that do not 
receive the subsidy (Cornia and Stewart (1983)), would be much lower.   
  The official targeting criterion could be the connection itself, together with certain 
household characteristics, so as to reduce the incentive effect and further leakages. Moreover, 
since the subsidies would represent a one-off capital payment, administrative costs could be kept 
relatively low (Estache et al. (2002)). 
  Despite these apparent advantages, if a connection subsidy scheme was approved, the 
main obstacle for the government would be the lack of adequate resources. On the one hand, the 
public sector cannot expect the private operators to use their own revenues but on the other hand, 
the public sector generally lacks the resources to do so. Besides, an external regulator cannot 
compel a company to provide new connections at lower costs without compensation (Abdala 
(1996)).  
  In the past, Cambodia has based its revenue collection on international trade taxes (in 
1997, they represented 58 percent of total tax revenue - Lao-Araya (2003)). However, 
Cambodian membership of ASEAN and its adoption of the Common Effective Preferential 
Tariff (CEPT) scheme, which requires the reduction of tariff rates among the members, are both 
likely to lead to a reduction in total tax revenues, certainly in the short-term. This may be 
problematic for Cambodia, where the tax base is quite restricted, with few taxpayers in the 
formal sector who have either high taxable income or consumption, and where the share of direct 
taxes is very low (in 1999 it was only 6.3 percent of total revenues as compared to 33 percent of 
indirect and trade taxes), much lower than in Vietnam or Thailand (20 percent and 30 percent 
respectively – ADB (2000)). Though, in the light of the current situation in regard to poverty, 
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Cambodia is not in a position to reduce its social expenditures. In fact, the country has already 
initiated important reforms of its tax system in regard to the expansion of the tax base, the 
development of robust tax auditing procedures and the introduction of stronger tax 
administration institutions. 
  In the light of these reforms and in the context of Cambodia’s recent strong economic 
performance, the government has managed to increase expenditures on socioeconomic 
development enhancing fiscal revenues (which increased from 8 percent of GDP in 1998 to 12 
percent in 2001), attracting more foreign financing for public investments and reducing 
expenditures on defence and security (CDC, CRDB (2002)). However, the level of spending on 
economic services is still regarded as inadequate to achieve poverty reduction objectives (see 
Naron (2002), Deputy Secretary General, Ministry of Economy and Finance) and this raises the 
obvious question as to where additional resources for the development of the water distribution 
system would come from.  
  From 1995 to 2002 the total funding in health by the government increased threefold, 
with important achievements in this sector. However, data show that the incidence of benefits is 
skewed away from the poor and toward the middle and wealthy groups, with certain areas left 
behind (Naron (2002)) and with maternal and child health neglected (IFAPER (2003)). Thus, a 
possible solution may be found in the nature of water as a merit good and in terms of both the 
welfare gains outlined and the wide-reaching positive externalities of safe water on health, a 
better management of the existing resources aimed at the provision of safe water targeted to the 
poorest may lead to broader social benefits.  
  Concluding, it must be borne in mind that the connection subsidy itself is not to be 
considered as a one-off solution to the water problem, even though it could represent a first step   32
to serve the poor. The literature identifies other factors that ought to be considered to facilitate 
improvements to the service:
46 
-  the introduction of private operators in the Cambodian environment may represent a 
good stimulus for the government and MIME.  However, regulation of utilities should be 
seen as a priority, both for private and public sector operators, so as to promote 
accountability and a basis for competition among them (DeRaet and Subbarao (1999)).
47 
The presence of a regulator should also reduce information asymmetries and protect the 
consumers from the exercise of monopoly power.  However, it is also important to ensure 
that the regulator itself is eager to address the special needs of the poor. For this to 
happen, a clear policy environment in which to function is a sine qua non;
48   
-  over the next years it will be important to see if the government will be able to reduce 
inefficiencies, giving more autonomy and decentralizing the public utilities
49 and giving 
autonomy to the regulator. Also the contract between the government and the private 
sector requires re-thinking.  Besides introducing a clearer and more transparent  licensing 
procedures, the relationship should allow for a greater degree of flexibility within a clear 
(binding) mandate to serve the poor;  
-  in this sense, it would be important to allow also a certain degree of flexibility in service 
provision, considering alternative solutions, from the material used (varying diameter 
pipes according to the location) to the payment modalities (at the time of the survey some 
of the utilities had already started allowing a small percentage of households to pay in 
instalments (e.g., Kompong Chhnang, Bantey Meanchey, Kompong Speu));                          
 
                                                 
46 A number of these policy recommendations do not draw on the empirical analysis undertaken.  
47 Clarke et al. (2003), hypothesise that benchmark-competition may encourage public utilities to improve their own 
performance.  
48 “It is not the role of the regulator to set policy but to ensure that it is implemented”. Brocklehurst and Evans 
(2001), p.10.  
49 The Provincial Management Law PBML of February 1998 devolves water supply to provinces and 
municipalities.   33
  The results reported in this study can be considered as a first necessary step to understand 
the demand-side relationship that underlies the Cambodian water sector. However, it is 
acknowledged that future analysis should be undertaken to capture other important factors. In 
particular, in order to assess precisely the need and the amount of a subsidy, the cost of the 
service should be directly compared with some measure of household willingness to pay (Foster 
et al. (2000)), taking into account the fee-elasticity.  Furthermore, an accurate analysis of the 
performances and of the level of coverage of the private and public sectors and the attitudes of 
the households towards them ought to be conducted. The rather superficial and tentative analysis 
undertaken here supports the notion that households supplied by private utilities appear more 
price-sensitive implying lower welfare effects. In the light of these results, in cities supplied by 
private operators the “additional factors” listed above become even more important, confirming 
the need to capture those elements that can form the basis for future mutual improvements for 
the two sectors and for the system as a whole.    34
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Table 3.1: Description of Variables  
Name Description 
watcon  Amount of water consumed monthly in cubic meters.
50 The variable was constructed dividing the amount of 
the last monthly water bill by the unit tariff charged by the water utility (Riels/m
3)      
D_watcon  Dummy=1 if the household (h/h) is connected,  zero otherwise 
D_kspeu  Dummy=1 if town= Kampong Speu, zero otherwise  
D_bmchy  Dummy=1 if town= Bantey Meanchey, zero otherwise 
D_tak  Dummy=1 if town= Takeo, zero otherwise  
D_kandtak  Dummy=1 if town= Kandal (Takmao), zero otherwise 
D_btbg  Dummy=1 if town= Battambang, zero otherwise 
D_kchng  Dummy=1 if town= Kampong Chhang, zero otherwise 
D_srieng  Dummy=1 if town= Svay Rieng, zero otherwise 
D_kankie  Dummy=1 if town= (Kandal) Kien Svay, zero otherwise 
logprice1  The log of the official price reported by the water utilities  
logprice2  The log of the official price reported by the water utilities, considering the presence of subcontractors for 
those households supplied by a subcontractor 
logexp  The log of total household expenditure  
logfee  The log of the one-off cost the h/h needs to pay to get connected to the network 
television  Dummy=1 if the h/h owns a colour television, zero otherwise 
telephone  Dummy=1 if the h/h owns a telephone, zero otherwise 
motorcycle  Dummy=1 if the h/h owns a motorcycle, zero otherwise 
car  Dummy=1 if the h/h owns a car, zero otherwise 
fridge  Dummy=1 if the h/h owns a refrigerator, zero otherwise 
rental  Dummy=1 if the h/h owns a rented property, zero otherwise 
electricity  Dummy=1 if the h/h has electricity, zero otherwise 
members   How many people live in the h/h 
edu1  Dummy=1 if the head of the h/h has no education, zero otherwise 
edu2  Dummy=1 if the head of the h/h has Pagoda school, zero otherwise 
edu3  Dummy=1 if the head of the h/h has primary school (incomplete or complete), zero otherwise 
edu4  Dummy=1 if the head of the h/h has secondary school (incomplete or complete), zero otherwise 
edu5  Dummy=1 if the head of the h/h has high school (incomplete or complete), zero otherwise 
edu6  Dummy=1 if the head of the h/h has vocational college or other type of school, zero otherwise 
edu7  Dummy=1 if the head of the h/h has university, zero otherwise 
ethnic  Dummy=1 if the head of the h/h belongs to non Khmer ethnic groups, zero otherwise 
age  Age of the head of the h/h 
agesq  Squared age of the head of the h/h 
years  How long has the h/h lived on that house. The variable was used (also) with splines, with the knots places at 
1, 4, 19, 19  
D_mul  Variable constructed dividing the number of people earning income by the number of members of the h/h. 
Dummy=1 if > than the threshold value 0.3077, zero otherwise 
qualityƒ  Dummy=1 if the respondent is very satisfied or satisfied with the quality of the water supplied, zero 
otherwise 
reliabilityƒ  Dummy=1 if respondent believes the piped water supply to be very reliable or reliable, zero otherwise  
                                                 
50 Conversion units: 1000 L=1 cubic meter  
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gardeningƒ   Dummy=1 if the h/h uses piped water for gardening, zero otherwise 
animalsƒ  Dummy=1 if the h/h uses piped water for animals, zero otherwise  
washingƒ  Dummy= if the h/h uses pied water for washing and bathing, 0 otherwise 
tradeƒ  Dummy=1 if the h/h uses piped water for commercial purposes, zero otherwise 
shareƒ  Dummy=1 if the h/h shares the water connection with its neighbours, zero otherwise 
clear1ƒ  Dummy=1 if the piped water is clear, 0 otherwise 
clear2ƒ  Dummy=1 if the piped water is not clear, 0 otherwise 
clear3ƒ  Dummy=1 if the piped water is clear depending on the season, 0 otherwise 
Notes: ƒ denotes variables, only available for those households who consume connected water, used in the second stage of the 
Heckman two-step procedure.  
 
 
Table 3.2: Asset Ownership in Cambodian 
Households 
Asset  Percentage of households that own 
the asset 
 Non-connected  Connected 
Television 62.2  90.2 
Telephone 2.8  27.6 
Motorcycle 61.6  86.2 
Car 8.8  17.1 
Refrigerator 0.6  6.8   43
 
Table 4.1: Household Water Consumption Model  
Tobit model 
Variable  Estimated coefficients
a 

















































































































































































































































































2         0.097  0.078  0.076 
Log likelihood  -1876.7  -1915.7  -1919.1 














































































Notes:        a: t-values in parentheses; b: p-values in parentheses;  
*** significance at 1%; ** significance at 5% ;  * significance at 10%;  
τ  variable omitted in the estimation; n/a: not applicable 
 
 
Table 4.2: Price and Expenditure Elasticities using Price1 – Tobit Model 






1  -0.337  [-0.672 / -0.001]  0.556  [0.423 / 0.690] 
2  -0.468  [-0.813 / -0.123]  0.796  [0.666 / 0.926] 
3  -0.558  [-0.903 / -0.213]  1.64  [1.372 / 1.915] 
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Table 4.3: Household Water 



























































Number of obs   =  782 
Wald χ
2
26   =   223.31 
Pseudo R
2   = 0.3665 
Log pseudo-likelihood =  -341.15188                46


























Notes: a:(asymptotic) t- values in 
parentheses;  b: p-values in parentheses; 
***significance at 1% ; **significance at 
5%; *significance at 10% 
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Table 4.4: Household Water Consumption Model 
OLS Model 
Variable  Estimated coefficients
a 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 





































































































































































































































































2  0.374 0.431 0.383 0.436 
Tests on the Model
b 
Reset  























Homoskedasticity Corrected  Corrected  Corrected  Corrected 


















n/a  0.76 
(0.6009) 
n/a 










Corrected 29.58***   
(0.0000) 
Corrected 
Notes: a: t-values in parentheses; b: p-values in parentheses; ***significance at 1% ; **significance at 5%; 





Table 4.5: Price and Expenditure Elasticities – OLS Estimates 






(1)  -0.407  [-0.625 / -0.188]  0.191  [0.082 / 0.300] 
(2)  -0.470  [-0.702 / -0.236]  0.732  [0.524 / 0.940] 
(3)  -0.523  [-0.735 / -0.312]  0.190  [0.080 / 0.300] 







































provided to all 
η  =0.4   
B. Meanchey  1,147,265  428,201  73,648  501,848  0.373  0.437 
K. Speau  391,768  207,751  40,413  248,163  0.530  0.633 
Takeo 1,054,341  290,732  50,690  341,421 0.276  0.324 
Kandal 711,918 
(713,222)    
367,918     76,800 
(78,104)    
444,718 
(446,023)    
.517    













K.  Chhang  915,290  305,349  34,146  339,495  0.334  0.371 
S. Rieng  555,067  341,739  17,445  359,184  0.616  0.647 
K. Svay  701,749  351,001  77,187  428,188  0.500  0.610 
Notes: The first four columns are in Riels: the last two are ratios.  The variable logprice1 was used throughout to 
be consistent with the previous analyses. However, for Kandal and Battambang, the only two towns with 
subcontractors, the results using logprice2 are reported in parenthesis 
 
                                                 
51 The test reported is based on a Wald test, that uses the corrected variance covariance matrix, converted 
automatically to an F-test by STATA. This conversion is valid when the degrees of freedom of the denominator are 
large.   49
 
  Table 4.7: Welfare Effect of Connection 
on the Gini Coefficient 




η=0.4      
Expenditure 0.409  0.380  0.029 
Exppos 0.439  0.407  0.032 
Income 0.403  0.375  0.028 
Incpos 0.470  0.435  0.035 
η=0.5          
Expenditure 0.409  0.383  0.027 
Exppos 0.439  0.410  0.029 
Income 0.403  0.378  0.025 
Incpos 0.470  0.439  0.031 APPENDIX  
 
A1 - SELECTED PRODUCTION AND FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WATER UTILITIES 
  PUBLIC UTILITIES  PRIVATE UTILITIES 
  Battambang Kampong   
Chhang 







Population of town  139,964  41,703  58,264  21,205  98,848  41,478  -  39,186 
Number of h/h
52 25,584  7,692  10,266  4,112  18,374  7,552  -  7,257 
Year establishment in current 
form 
1993 1996  1979  1980 1998  1997  1998  1997 
Current Production capacity 
(m
3/day) 
3750 960  780  400 3000  1500  1632  1300 
Current production (m
3/day)   2750  200  780  320  1200  560  176  120 
Capacity utilized (%)  73.33  20.83  100  80  40  37.33  10.78  9.23 
Tot. number of direct 
connection 
1766 409  580  393 1500  1700  230  450 
Residential 1618  406  561  375  1423  1510  229  N/A 
Business 78  N/A  5  N/A  50  180  N/A  N/A 
Government 70  2  14  18  25  10  1  13 
% of h/h covered  6.33  5.28  5.47  9.13  7.74  19.93  -  6.21 
N. of sub-contractors to utility  4  0  3  0  0  0  0  0 
N. of connections served by 
sub-contractors 
2046 0  239  0  0  0 0  0 
Connection fee as declared by 
the utility (Riels) 




350,000 76,000 190,000  228,000 
Average one-off connection 
cost as declared by the h/h 
(Riels) 
175,222.5 182,720  357,487  108,204.4 384,708.3  182,384.1 195,957.5  233,446.8 
Water tariff (Riels/m
3) 1400  1000  550  600  1300  1500  1400  1800 
Average price of vendor in 
town
53 
10,000 6,000  10,000  2,500 10,000  7,500  10,000  7,500 
                                                 
52 CNPRD, 2004 
53 DeRaet and Subbarao, 1999  
 
a-2




15.700 10.614  17.831  12.881 14.156  9.938  14.681  12.476 
                  Note: the information are taken from Table 1 of Garn et al. (2002),  but for the ones with footnotes 
                                                 
54 Computed using the cleaned-up data  and using information from the h/h questionnaire  
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A2 – THE TOBIT MODEL  
 
TOBIT MODEL: specification with assets, using the variable price1  
 - marginal effect, unconditional expected value - 
 
variable  dF/dx  Std. Err.  z  P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ] 
logprice1 -2.57541 1.281828 -2.01 0.045 -508.775  -0.063073
D_kspeu* 4.977223 1.384393 3.6 0 2.26386  7.69058
D_tak* 2.273515 1.469719 1.55 0.122 -0.607082  5.15411
D_btbg* 4.919137 1.193244 4.12 0 2.58042  7.25785
D_kchng* -0.2869681 1.059547 -0.27 0.787 -2.36364  1.78971
D_srieng* 0.3871941 1.033635 0.37 0.708 -1.63869 2.41308
D_kankie* 0.4469746 1.245584 0.36 0.72 -1.99433 2.88828
logexp 4.252678 0.5095156 8.35 0 3.25405  5.25131
television* 2.366415 0.9092426 2.6 0.009 0.584332 4.1485
telephone* 5.163953 0.7771365 6.64 0 3.64079  6.68711
motorcycle* 1.590394 0.8070569 1.97 0.049 0.008591  3.1722
car* 0.3534877 0.8503545 0.42 0.678 -1.31318  2.02015
rental* 3.532462 1.269737 2.78 0.005 1.04382  6.0211
electricity* 2.602801 1.812881 1.44 0.151 -0.950381  6.15598
members 0.3003477 0.1143514 2.63 0.009 0.076223  0.524472
edu2* 1.861526 1.824029 1.02 0.307 -1.71351  5.43656
edu3* -2.627323 1.162451 -2.26 0.024 -4.90568  -0.34896
edu4* -1.239999 1.008061 -1.23 0.219 -3.21576  0.735763
edu5* -1.15399 1.091407 -1.06 0.29 -3.29311  0.985128
edu6* -1.165163 1.699788 -0.69 0.493 -4.49669  2.16636
edu7* -0.764614 1.619225 -0.47 0.637 -3.93824  2.40901
ethnic* 1.92962 1.067142 1.81 0.071 -0.161939  4.02118
age 0.380749 0.1757863 2.17 0.03 0.036214  0.725284
agesq -0.0039106 0.0018445 -2.12 0.034 -0.007526  -0.000295
yearsa -1.268115 3.622509 -0.35 0.726 -8.3681  5.83187
yearsb -0.2143787 0.5368502 -0.4 0.69 -1.26659  0.837828
yearsc -0.1223688 0.1948663 -0.63 0.53 -0.5043  0.259562
yearsd 0.2304666 0.1210111 1.9 0.057 -0.006711  0.467644
yearse -1.781.071 0.6069339 -2.93 0.003 -2.97064  -0.591503
D_mul* 3.671897 0.6301673 5.83 0 2.43679  4.907
_cons -54.04614 11.38317 -4.75 0 -76.3568  -31.7355
 
Note: the STATA .dtobit command provides the marginal effects evaluated at the means of the independent 
variables. 
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.   
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TOBIT MODEL: specification without assets, non correcting for the endogeneity of expenditure 
- marginal effect, unconditional expected value - 
 
variable  dF/dx  Std. Err.  z  P>|z|  X_at  [    95%  C.I.   ] 
logprice1 -3.57805  1.319319 -2.71 0.007 6.98461 -6.16387  -0.99223
D_kspeu*  5.570711  1.417876 3.93 0 0 --> 1 2.79173  8.3497
D_tak*  3.287941  1.517171 2.17 0.03 0 --> 1 0.31434  6.26154
D_btbg*  5.805784  1.241366 4.68 0 0 --> 1 3.37275  8.23882
D_kchng*  -0.4291  1.113337 -0.39 0.7 0 --> 1 -2.6112  1.753
D_srieng*  0.162759  1.085209 0.15 0.881 0 --> 1 -1.96421  2.28973
D_kankie*  1.341349  1.292084 1.04 0.299 0 --> 1 -1.19109  3.87379
logexp 6.084978  0.498382 12.21 0 12.8948 5.10817  7.06179
members  0.381581 0.119714 3.19 0.001 6.28772 0.146946 0.616215
edu2*  3.258122  1.900995 1.71 0.087 0 --> 1 -0.46776  6.984
edu3*  -2.07485  1.204292 -1.72 0.085 0 --> 1 -4.43522  0.28552
edu4*  -0.37502  1.048851 -0.36 0.721 0 --> 1 -2.43073  1.68069
edu5*  0.242215  1.130751 0.21 0.83 0 --> 1 -1.97402  2.45845
edu6*  0.963692  1.754369 0.55 0.583 0 --> 1 -2.47481  4.40219
edu7*  1.55429  1.674947 0.93 0.353 0 --> 1 -1.72855  4.83713
ethnic*  2.986117  1.124294 2.66 0.008 0 --> 1 0.782542  5.18969
age  0.361527 0.183247 1.97 0.049 44.789 0.002369 0.720684
agesq  -0.00357 0.001923 -1.86 0.063 2122.74 -0.00734 0.000194
yearsa -0.54418  3.840351 -0.14 0.887 0.990107 -8.07113  6.98277
yearsb  -0.2525 0.562933 -0.45 0.654 2.71125 -1.35583 0.850832
yearsc  -0.13463 0.203943 -0.66 0.509 4.34399 -0.53435 0.265093
yearsd 0.21402  0.12626 1.7 0.09 4.26087 -0.03344  0.461484
yearse -1.93846  0.632672 -3.06 0.002 0.492327 -3.17847  -0.69845
D_mul*  3.930235  0.658664 5.97 0 0 --> 1 2.63928  5.22119
_cons -65.9715  11.88752 -5.55 0 1 -89.2706  -42.6724
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TOBIT MODEL: specification without assets, correcting for the endogeneity of expenditure 
- marginal effect, unconditional expected value - 
                         
variable  dF/dx  Std. Err.  z  P>|z|  X_at  [    95% C.I.   ] 
logprice1 -4.26666  1.317508 -3.24 0.001 6.98461 -6.84893  -1.68439
D_kspeu*  12.05093  1.565695 7.7 0 0 --> 1 8.98222  15.1196
D_tak*  5.782918  1.539384 3.76 0 0 --> 1 2.76578  8.80006
D_btbg*  5.312027  1.238558 4.29 0 0 --> 1 2.8845  7.73956
D_kchng*  0.471224  1.102229 0.43 0.669 0 --> 1 -1.6891  2.63155
D_srieng*  1.960962  1.10754 1.77 0.077 0 --> 1 -0.20978  4.1317
D_kankie*  3.091534  1.299925 2.38 0.017 0 --> 1 0.543729  5.63934
logexphat   12.56171  1.038832 12.09 0 12.8948 10.5256  14.5978
members  -0.1172 0.135559 -0.86 0.387 6.28772 -0.38289 0.148487
edu2*  2.128173  1.896652 1.12 0.262 0 --> 1 -1.5892  5.84554
edu3*  -2.7352  1.211747 -2.26 0.024 0 --> 1 -5.11018  -0.36022
edu4*  -0.90861  1.050951 -0.86 0.387 0 --> 1 -2.96843  1.15122
edu5*  -0.85347  1.136782 -0.75 0.453 0 --> 1 -3.08152  1.37459
edu6*  -1.0842  1.774432 -0.61 0.541 0 --> 1 -4.56203  2.39362
edu7*  -0.92158  1.70946 -0.54 0.59 0 --> 1 -4.27206  2.4289
ethnic*  1.359537  1.128242 1.21 0.228 0 --> 1 -0.85178  3.57085
age  0.19322 0.183889 1.05 0.293 44.789 -0.1672 0.553634
agesq  -0.00161 0.001932 -0.83 0.404 2122.74 -0.0054 0.002176
yearsa -3.36415  3.814154 -0.88 0.378 0.990107 -10.8398  4.11145
yearsb 0.267399  0.559979 0.48 0.633 2.71125 -0.83014  1.36494
yearsc  -0.19205 0.203471 -0.94 0.345 4.34399 -0.59084 0.206747
yearsd  0.295046 0.127346 2.32 0.021 4.26087 0.045453 0.544639
yearse -1.80673  0.649207 -2.78 0.005 0.492327 -3.07915  -0.53431
D_mul*  2.949249  0.663393 4.45 0 0 --> 1 1.64902  4.24948




TOBIT MODEL: price and expenditure elasticities using price2, for specifications 1, 2, 3 
 
Specification  Η Price  95% Conf. 
Interval 
η Expenditure  95% Conf. 
Interval 
1  -0.178 n.s.  [-0.511 / 0.155]  0.549  [0.416 / 0.683] 
2  -0.345  [-0.688 / -0.002]  0.794  [0.664 / 0.925] 
3  -0.366  [-0.709 / -0.025]  1.622  [1.351 / 1.893] 
       n.s.= non significant  
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A3 – THE PROBIT MODEL  
 
 




Std. Err.  z  P>|z|  x-bar  [    95%  C.I.   ] 
D_watcon              
logfee -0.2116755  0.05655  -3.75  0 122.021  -0.322512  -0.10084 
D_kspeu* 0.2302707  0.076038  2.6  0.009  0.118926  0.081239  0.379302 
D_tak* 0.0845908  0.073355  1.12 0.264  0.120205  -0.059182  0.228364 
D_btbg* 0.2020516  0.076523  2.33  0.02 0.121483  0.052069  0.352034 
D_kchng* -0.0150609 0.08318  -0.18  0.856  0.116368  -0.178091 0.147969 
D_srieng* -0.0871046  0.111587  -0.79  0.431  0.122762  -0.305811 0.131602 
D_kankie* -0.1435682 0.075268  -1.91  0.056  0.121483  -0.291091 0.003954 
logexp 0.3747345  0.051298  7.34  0  128.948  0.274192  0.475277 
television* 0.167663  0.064751  2.59  0.01  0.774936  0.040753  0.294573 
telephone* 0.328801 0.05265  4.69  0  0.163683  0.22561 0.431992 
motorcycle* 0.1440405  0.056078  2.57  0.01  0.750639  0.03413  0.253951 
car* -0.1349215  0.075532  -1.79  0.073  0.132992  -0.282962  0.013119 
fridge* 0.256054  0.118181  1.66  0.097  0.039642  0.024423  0.487685 
electricity* 0.1881665 0.130759  1.42  0.156  0.933504  -0.068116 0.444449 
members -0.0030612  0.009917  -0.31  0.758  628.772 -0.022499  0.016376 
edu2* -0.0028693  0.130772  -0.02  0.982  0.030691  -0.259178  0.253439 
edu3* -0.1949709  0.089081  -2.16  0.03  0.170077  -0.369567  -0.02038 
edu4* -0.0893117  0.081379  -1.1  0.272  0.377238  -0.248812  0.070188 
edu5* -0.0565515  0.086809  -0.65  0.513  0.2289  -0.226693  0.11359 
edu6* -0.2618985  0.131743  -1.86  0.063  0.038363  -0.52011  -0.00369 
edu7* -0.0492157  0.160981  -0.31  0.758  0.039642  -0.364732  0.266301 
ethnic* 0.3099744  0.063161  3.4 0.001  0.065217  0.186181  0.433768 
age 0.0377268  0.012393  3.04  0.002  44.789  0.013436  0.062017 
agesq -0.000362  0.00013  -2.79  0.005  2122.74  -0.000616  -0.00011 
years -0.0054238  0.003186  -1.7  0.089  127.985  -0.011668  0.00082 
D_mul* 0.226165  0.044643  4.95  0  0.590793  0.138667  0.313663 
Number of obs =    782           
Wald χ
2
26 = 223.31         
obs. P = 0.5473146           
pred. P = 0.5880945           
Prob > χ
2   = 0.0000         
Pseudo R
2     = 0.3665           
Log pseudo-likelihood = -341.15188           
pred. P= 0.5880945  (at x-bar)           
 
Note: the STATA command .dprobit reports the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each 
independent, continuous variable and, by default, the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables. 
Thus, (*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. z and P>|z| are the test of the 
underlying coefficient being 0.   
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A4 - WELFARE EFFECT ANALYSIS 
 


























% unc./con.  
h/h exp 
with service 
provided to all 
η=0.5   
B. Meanchey  1138891  428200.8  65274.07  493474.8  .3759805  .4332941 
K. Speau  388209.1  207750.7  36853.64  244604.3  .5351515  .6300839 





















K.  Chhang  911915.3  305348.8  30771.46  336120.3  .3348434  .3685872 
S. Rieng  553715.9  341738.7  16094.62  357833.3  .6171733  .6462399 
K. Svay  693316.6  351001  68755.05  419756.1  .5062637  .6054321 
η=0.4   
B. Meanchey  1147265  428200.8    73647.66    501848.4    .3732363     .4374304 
K. Speau  391768.2     207750.7    40412.73    248163.4    .5302898     .6334444 
Takeo  1054341  290731.5    50689.64    341421.2    .2757472     .3238244 
Kandal 711918.3 
(713222.6)    
367918.4    76800.48 
78104.84   
444718.8 
446023.2   
.5167986    





368357.9    82548.03 
(82971.66)   
450905.9 
(451329.6)   
.4488347    
(.4486032)    
.5494173 
(.5496498) 
K.  Chhang  915290.2     305348.8    34146.34    339495.2    .3336087     .3709154 
S. Rieng  555066.8     341738.7    17445.47    359184.2    .6156713     .6471008 
K. Svay  701748.8  351001  77187.27    428188.3    .5001804     .6101732 
 
 


















  % unc./con. h/h inc 
 
6 
% unc./con.  
h/h inc 
with service 
provided to all 
η=0.5           
B. Meanchey  1123526  399574.3  65274.07  464848.3  .3556431  .4137405 
K.  Speau  431306.3 204848.6 36853.64  241702.2  .4749492  5603957 
Takeo 1058484  364440.8  46764.59  411205.4  .3443046  .3884854 
Kandal 657844.9 
(659293.1) 
401628.3 64019.39     
(65467.56) 
465647.8   
(467095.9) 














K.  Chhang  889015.3 309106.2 30771.46  339877.7  .347695  .382308 
S.  Rieng  489256.5 349243.4 16094.62  365338.1  .7138247  .7467209 
K.  Svay  693828.1 373975.5 68755.05  442730.6  .5390031  .6380984 
η=0.4           
B. Meanchey  1131900  399574.3     73647.66    473221.9    .3530121     .4180776 
K. Speau  434865.4     204848.6     40412.73    245261.3    .4710621     .5639936 





















K.  Chhang  892390.1 309106.2 34146.34  343252.6  .3463801  .3846441 
S.  Rieng  490607.4 349243.4 17445.47  366688.9  .7118593  .7474182 
K. Svay  702260.3     373975.5     77187.27    451162.8    .5325312     .6424439 
The variable logprice1 was used in this calculations. However, for Kandal and Battambang, the only two towns with subcontractors, the results 
using logprice2 are reported in parenthesis. 